

# THE BARUCH PLAN AND THE NUCLEAR JEREMIAD

by

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## **Chapter One: The Baruch Plan: Introductory Matters**

### **Introduction and Literature Review**

The advent of nuclear weapons at the end of World War Two created massive changes in technology, warfare, and diplomacy. After an Allied victory in the European theatre, the United States prepared for a final confrontation with Japan. Nuclear weapons changed the character of that assault as "two mighty blasts awesomely punctuated the end of the most violent war in history" (Baruch, 1960, p. 358). The development and use of nuclear weapons also punctuated American history; scientists had finally opened the ultimate "Pandora's Box." Americans had looked forward to peace, yet suddenly faced "horrors greater than the world had yet known" which made the desired peace a necessity (Coit, 1957, p. 561). Fundamental alterations in specific cultures normally occur slowly, perhaps only perceptible from the hindsight of the historian. The nuclear era, however, was different, in that it "burst upon the world with terrifying suddenness" (Boyer, 1985, p. 4). The onset of nuclear weapons introduced a new factor which profoundly altered American (and world) culture: the bomb "transformed not only military strategy and international relations, but the fundamental ground of culture and consciousness" (Boyer, 1985, p. xix).

Despite their importance, the discursive aspects of the Nuclear Age have received little attention from rhetorical critics. A

survey of the contents of The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Communication Monographs, Central States Speech Journal, Western Journal of Speech Communication, Southern Speech Communication Journal, Communication Quarterly, and Journal of the American Forensic Association reveals that articles on nuclear issues are rare and that even the exceptions treat nuclear issues as secondary to particular speakers, to the rhetoric of international relations, or to the advancement of a particular critical tool.

While there has been relatively little critical attention paid to nuclear issues since World War Two, there are signs that rhetorical critics are at last becoming interested in nuclear issues and texts. Goodnight (1983) examines Congressional hearings concerned with nuclear evacuation policy as an example of public debate and explores the tension between the grounding of argument in the technical and public spheres of argument. Goodnight (1986), Rushing (1986), and Bjork (1988) examine Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" speech as a challenge to conventional wisdom of deterrence, part of a New Frontier Myth, and as means of subverting the nuclear freeze movement, respectively. Foss and Littlejohn (1986) examine nuclear issues in popular culture by describing the rhetorical vision found in the television program "The Day After." Dauber's work focuses on the technical aspects of nuclear weapons deterrence strategy (1987) and the validity standards used to judge evidentiary claims in technical nuclear policy discourse (1988). Kane (1988) examines the

retorical use of nuclear history which entrenches values and allows political re-interpretation of foreign policy events. Hynes (1988) discusses the various publics involved in nuclear arms negotiations and describes this argumentation as circumscribing public debate on nuclear matters. Schiappa (1989) and Kauffman (1989) discuss the rhetorical implications of nuclear language choices. Studies such as these mark a promising beginning. However, a thorough understanding of nuclear discourse must take into account its roots in the early atomic era.

### **Justification and Organization of Study**

The present study seeks to develop a generic perspective toward nuclear criticism. In doing so, it will focus on the early nuclear age. In January of 1946, an agreement within the young United Nations created the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), charged with the task of eliminating the threat caused by nuclear weapons. On June 14, 1946, Truman's appointed representative to the Commission, Bernard Baruch, gave a speech that has been called his "greatest contribution to world history" (White, 1950, p. 109). Baruch called for the creation of an international agency to oversee the development of peaceful uses for atomic energy and to proscribe the military use of nuclear weapons. This particular text, known as the Baruch Plan, is appropriate to study for a number of reasons. First, it is the first major public statement following Hiroshima to express the United States'

position on the international control of nuclear weapons, making it a key text in the chronology of "official" nuclear discourse. The destructive ability of nuclear energy was demonstrated in Japan to be of huge proportions, and most people considered the avoidance of nuclear destruction a commensurate challenge. Government, the military, and scientists worked together to devise a means of control, convinced that the gravity of the crisis demanded a response of great magnitude. The Baruch Plan was the culmination of American policy that was two years in the making.

Second, the Baruch Plan set the stage for subsequent United Nations discussion on disarmament and arms control (Rosembloom, 1953). The United Nations was to be the forum in which much international negotiation took place, and it was expected that the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission would bear the burden of devising international control mechanisms that would meliorate the nuclear threat. The manner in which the early agenda items were handled would "set a pattern for the future" (Hewlett & Anderson, 1962, p. 577). Years later, Baruch's speech was described by a biographer as containing recommendations on atomic energy control which continue to stand "as the wisest counsel in the membership of the United States Commission on Atomic Energy" which formulated United States policy in the United Nations (Rosenbloom, 1953, p. 24).

Third, the speech is important because it is an example of early nuclear discourse which continues to inform present nuclear

discourse. The Baruch Plan participates in a genre of discourse on nuclear issues that sheds a unique light on contemporary discourse. Boyer's (1985) historical analysis of the early nuclear age suggests that a complete understanding of current nuclear status depends on understanding the past since "all the major elements of our contemporary engagement with the nuclear reality took shape" immediately following the advent of nuclear weapons (p. xix). By critically analyzing the Baruch Plan, one may uncover the themes characteristic of the early nuclear age which Boyer argues "still dominate our nuclear discourse today" (1985, p. xix). This study focuses on the Baruch Plan as a representative text of the early nuclear age. The speech represents the early steps to confront and control nuclear weapons and is evidence that our current discourse is rooted in the period immediately following the development and use of nuclear weapons. Boyer explains that it is important to recover nuclear history because "it was in that era which now seems so distant that the fundamental perceptions which continue to influence our response to the nuclear menace were first articulated, discussed, and absorbed into the living tissue of the culture" (1985, p. 367). It was in that era that Baruch offered a prophetic vision of the horror of nuclear weapons and a challenge to the world to work together for peace -- a vision that continues to speak to the world today. It is through an understanding of the nuclear past that we can assess the nuclear present and the prospects for a non-nuclear



future.

This chapter has provided a literature review and a rationale for studying nuclear issues and the Baruch Plan in particular. Chapter Two provides the historical background of the speech. The rhetorical crisis created by nuclear weapons is discussed, as is the immediate context surrounding the speaker, Bernard Baruch, and his audience. The "results" of the speech as conventionally assessed are described. It is suggested that more meaningful assessments can be made by viewing the speech from a more carefully construed critical stance which allows the critic to consider both epideictic and deliberative elements found in a given nuclear text.

Chapter Three suggests a framework for examining the Baruch Plan generically. The rhetorical genre of the jeremiad is described and more recent applications of this genre to secular or modern concerns are discussed. The value of a jeremiadic perspective and the rhetorical functions which a jeremiad fulfills are explained. It is suggested that jeremiadic criticisms entail a set of standards by which nuclear discourse should be judged. These standards call into question assessments of "effectiveness" which rely too heavily upon standards applied traditionally to deliberative rhetoric.

Chapter Four examines the Baruch Plan from a jeremiadic perspective. Through a close textual analysis, it demonstrates that the speech fulfills the functions of a jeremiad and judges the text by the standards discussed in Chapter Three. It further argues that

the speech contains distinct generic characteristics which characterize a "nuclear jeremiad."

Chapter Five provides a critical assessment of the Baruch Plan based upon insights gained by a jeremiadic perspective. It argues that viewing the Baruch Plan as a jeremiad affords significant insight into the speech and into a particular genre of nuclear discourse, the nuclear jeremiad.

## **Chapter Two: Historical Context of the Baruch Plan**

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an historical context for the Baruch Plan. It describes the rhetorical exigence created by atomic weapons and the preliminary efforts to respond to the need for control. The United States representative to the UNAEC, Bernard Baruch, is introduced, as are the policy initiatives which collectively came to be known as the Baruch Plan. Finally, the immediate responses of various audiences to the Baruch Plan and the conventional assessment of the speech's "results" are described.

### **The Rhetorical Exigence**

The American public met the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with a great deal of apprehension. While there was great relief that the war was finally over, and also some pleasure in seeing Japan "repaid" for Pearl Harbor, there was a sense in which the victory was clouded by the fear of incalculable new dangers. The predominant response was a "surge of fear that swept America"; fear of the weapon which brought victory to the United States (Boyer, 1985, p. 66). The bomb had come as a surprise, having been developed, produced, and utilized in secret. The public's fear was thus based in part on what was not known about the bomb as well as on the reality of the weapon's use in Japan. The media and the public were quick to perceive nightmarish possibilities for the bomb. This weapon was the most destructive yet known, and was described in a

radio news report on August 6, 1945 as "so powerful that only the imagination of a trained scientist could dream of its existence" ("Atomic War," cited in Boyer, 1985, p. 4). Others warned of a world left to the insects, speculated on fire-storms sweeping the earth, and feared that science had produced Frankenstein's monster. One editorial expressed the feeling that one could sense the "foundations of one's own universe trembling" ("The Atomic Bomb," 1945). The fear was consistently described in primordial terms. The weapon represented the wresting of secrets from nature. Like Prometheus stealing fire from the gods, humans had finally harnessed the atom and those who drew the analogy feared divine retaliation. The fear which filled the national consciousness was a "primitive fear, the fear of the unknown, the fear of forces [humanity] can neither channel nor comprehend" (Cousins, 1945, p. 5).

While the technological capabilities of nuclear weapons had not yet made global holocaust an immediate possibility, the public response was to articulate a fear of annihilation. This "primal fear of extinction" (Boyer, 1985, p. 15) was reflected in the massive attention which the media devoted to atomic issues; both reporting what was known and speculating on the uncertain future implications of nuclear weapons. The media, encouraged by the nation's opinion-molding institutions such as churches, the government, and science, focused the public's attention on nuclear issues.

Consequently, the months after Hiroshima saw what has been described as "a national town meeting on the atomic bomb and its meaning" (Boyer, 1985, p. 31). A theme commonly evoked in the post-war climate was the need for immediate political action. An uncertainty about the future coupled with a certainty that action must be taken was apparent in many opinions. Columnist Elmer Davis expressed this sentiment of urgency: "Decisions made now, in the next two or three years, may determine the entire foreseeable future" (in Boyer, 1985, p. 29).

The changes wrought by nuclear weapons created a rhetorical exigence of enormous proportions. These weapons created "radical and profound changes" (Oppenheimer, 1946, p. 22) not only in world politics and military technology, but in the very relationship of humankind to itself and to nature. Nuclear weapons transformed the grounds of human reason, in that an "environment thought to be objective, neutral, and infinitely malleable" was threatened by "a technical ultimate -- one that could obliterate its own creators" and which engendered a belief that nature was finite and progress questionable. The "culture that resulted promised [in part]. . . a future without reality" by "rendering life itself vulnerable as an ongoing proposition" (Farrell & Goodnight, 1981, pp. 277-278). In the period following August 6, 1945, Americans were forced to confront a "new and threatening reality of almost unfathomable proportions" (Boyer, 1985, p. 25).

The reaction of the American public was shaped by both intense fear and a belief that an "urgent and decisive" political response was critical (Boyer, 1985, p. 32). At the time this public sense also was reflected in governmental circles both here and abroad: "At the end of World War II, in the immediate postwar context, there seemed to be a brief political resolve to remove nuclear weapons from the scene. World leaders. . . insisted on the importance of acting quickly. If such internationalization did not occur dire consequences were predicted" (Lifton & Falk, 1982, p. 198). The concern was thus not merely that of the masses, but also policy-makers. In this time of great fear and uncertainty, the public desperately needed reassurance that the extinction they feared would not come to pass. It appeared possible that the political resolve to provide that reassurance would be manifested in governmental decisions.

### **Preliminary Efforts to Control Nuclear Technology**

Among those clamoring to play a role in the shaping of American response, and perhaps the most forceful voices of all, were scientists -- many of whom had worked closely in developing the bomb. For most, the responsibility was pressing and the stakes high: "to shape, at the very dawn of the atomic age, the fundamental contours of national attitudes toward the bomb and influence the course of the nuclear future" (Boyer, 1985, p. 32). For these scientists, international control of atomic energy represented the

cause to be promoted. An October 1945 meeting of 515 scientists at Harvard and M.I.T. drafted a five-point statement which reflected a "rapidly evolving consensus" that "international cooperation of an unprecedented kind is necessary for our survival" (Walker, 1945, p. 44). Scientists who had worked closely with government agencies in the development of nuclear weapons, such as Vannevar Bush and James Conant, urged the need for international control (Anderson & Hewlett, 1962).

At the urging of scientists and members of Congress, in January of 1946 Secretary of State James F. Byrnes named a committee headed by Undersecretary Dean Acheson to prepare a plan to guide the shaping of U.S. policy. A United Nations agreement had created the UNAEC and the U.S. was expected to initiate discussions on atomic energy control in this body. Acheson named a five-person Board of Consultants chaired by David E. Lilienthal and including J. Robert Oppenheimer to provide technical expertise in the drafting of the proposal. On March 28, 1946, this consulting committee submitted its report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, which came to be known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. It proposed international cooperation in the peaceful development of atomic energy led by a United Nations authority that would survey and control all fissionable ore on the earth, license, construct, and monitor all national atomic energy facilities, and have broad inspection powers to detect the diversion of atomic technology

toward military purposes (Hewlett & Anderson, 1962). The Acheson-Lilienthal Report reflected "the drafters' belief in the power of reason, goodwill, and the spirit of scientific cooperation" (Boyer, 1985, p. 53), and was to heavily influence the articulation of U.S. policy in the Baruch Plan.

### **Bernard Baruch**

The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission held its first meeting on June 14, 1946. President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes selected Bernard Baruch to be the United States representative to the UNAEC. Baruch was an extremely successful Wall Street financier who had served the government in a number of capacities. He acted as advisor to every president from Wilson to Eisenhower. His role most often was that of an unofficial counselor, although he ran the War Industries Board under President Wilson and was "legendary" for his war mobilization efforts (Hewlett & Anderson, 1962, p. 577). For all of his government service, he never received compensation, though -- being a wealthy man -- he certainly did not need it (Rosenbloom, 1953, p. 35).

Baruch's government service, coupled with his "shrewd political use of his fortune" -- in the sense that he supported political careers and campaigns without apparant partisan bias -- had earned him many friends and a great deal of influence (Acheson, 1969, p. 154). He was held in high esteem and considered very influential abroad. He was perceived as a man of integrity and



selflessness (Grant, 1983), and was often labeled as knowledgeable, devoted, and possessing perseverance, consistency and foresight (Rosenbloom, 1953). His reputation as a businessperson and government servant led many to consider him well-qualified for the U.N. job. Consequently, Congress and the media reacted favorably to his selection and he faced little, if any, disapproval or delay in the confirmation of his appointment (Coit, 1957). The news media "never questioned Baruch's basic integrity nor his loyalty to America" (White, 1950, p. 103). Baruch was thus seen by the President and Byrnes as a spokesperson who could command respect. It was hoped that Baruch's ethos would "add weight to any proposal the United States put before the world" (Hewlett & Anderson, 1962, p. 556).

Baruch undertook his new assignment with vigor. Though he questioned at the outset his abilities because he was seventy-five years old (Baruch, 1960), his strongly held belief in international cooperation and professed horror at nuclear weapons compelled him to accept (Grant, 1983). Baruch was given the task of devising a proposal on international control of atomic energy which would represent U.S. policy and which he would present to the UNAEC. Working with the Acheson-Lilienthal Report yet not bound by it, he was granted the authority to create a policy that need be approved by Truman alone. After extensive research and consultation with scientists, politicians, and his own "team" of confidants and

advisors, he prepared and delivered the speech which represented the U.S. policy on nuclear weapons (Rosenbloom, 1953).

### **The Baruch Plan**

On June 14, 1946, the UNAEC met for the first time at the Hunter College gymnasium in the Bronx. Present were the delegates representing Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Present also were scientists, many of whom had provided insight and expertise in the drafting of the proposal, and the news media. Bernard Baruch took the rostrum to announce the U.S. proposal. He was described as presenting an "imposing appearance," "the embodiment of the elder statesman" (Hewlett & Anderson, 1962, p. 577), and also as "looking like everyone's grandfather" (Coit, 1957, p. 581). He delivered his speech "simply, directly, sometimes even haltingly," and with "visible pride in his role" (Coit, 1957, pp. 581-582). It has been suggested by one observer that his hesitation "underscored the seriousness of his purpose" (Coit, 1957, p. 581).

The plan itself was quite similar to the recommendations of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. He proposed that the United Nations should create an International Development Authority to control the development and use of nuclear energy. It would control all weapons that currently existed, inspect and license all atomic activities, and foster peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Once this authority was in

place and adequate controls existed, then the production of nuclear weapons would stop and existing bombs would be dismantled so that the international authority would be the sole possessor of nuclear technology. Baruch was unwavering in his conviction that violation of the new agreement should be met with condign punishment -- punishment in kind. He indicated the U.S. desire to allow the international body to hold out the threat, by its possession of nuclear weapons, to use nuclear weapons against countries that violated the provisions of the plan by developing nuclear weapons. Baruch followed this claim with the proposal that the ability of the international authority to inflict sanctions should not be weakened by the veto power of the Security Council. He suggested that the need for swift and sure punishment outweighed the right of any country to veto sanctions invoked by the atomic energy authority.

### **Response to the Plan**

Baruch's plan met with considerable support. "Praise rose in a clamor" after the U.S. policy was presented (Coit, 1957, p. 585), "congratulatory messages deluged Baruch's headquarters" (Hewlett & Anderson, 1962, p. 582), and Baruch later claimed that "public opinion upheld the plan by a large majority" (1960, p. 373). The media was certainly on the whole in favor of the plan: "Editors of the nation's leading newspapers and radio commentators called Baruch's speech and plan a masterly compound of imaginative idealism and tough practicality" (Rosenbloom, 1953, p. 276). With

the exception of isolationist newspapers, the media was overwhelmingly enthusiastic. The official reactions of most other members of the UNAEC were expressions of general approval. While there were differences, most notably on the issue of sanctions and the veto power, the Commission in general supported the proposals and principles conveyed by the plan.

However, the country from whom a positive response was most hoped for was the Soviet Union. Its representative, Andrei Gromyko, presented his country's official response on June 19. The Soviet Union proposed that an international agreement immediately prohibit the production and use of atomic weapons and that an authority to control atomic energy be created and put in place after all the signatories had obligated themselves not to use atomic weapons and had destroyed existing bombs. Essentially, the Soviet response would have reversed the order of the Baruch Plan. The Baruch Plan would allow the U.S. to maintain its atomic weapons until it was convinced that adequate controls were in place while at the same time preventing the Soviet Union from developing these weapons. "The U.S. thus preserved a de facto veto over the entire plan. . . While the Soviets gave up critical information about their fissionable resources and their progress in atomic-weapons research, in other words, the U.S. could retain and enlarge its stock of bombs, conduct its tests, and in general maintain its massive lead in the field" (Boyer, 1985, p. 54). The Soviet Union was trying to recover from a

devastating war on her territory and was deeply suspicious of the outside world, particularly a U.S. that possessed a weapon of hugely destructive proportions. Accordingly, "viewed from Moscow. . . the plan seemed a formula for perpetuating American nuclear superiority into the indefinite future" (Boyer, 1985, p. 55). Thus the Soviets insisted that a world moratorium on the production and use of atomic weapons must precede any agreement on international control. Negotiations within the UNAEC continued throughout the year.

In December, 1946, Baruch finally forced a vote, convinced that an impasse had been reached and that at least the votes of the committee would be on record before the world. The entire report received ten "ayes." The Soviet Union and Poland abstained. This completed Baruch's tenure on the Committee. The report would be submitted to the Security Council and the issue of disarmament would now be conducted within the larger forum of the United Nations.

Viewed in the context of 1945-1946, and viewed merely as a proposal put forward by the United States and rejected by the Soviet Union, an assessment of the Baruch Plan's effectiveness would be fairly negative. The speech gathered support from the media and the American public, thus it had a limited effect in generating support for its speaker and proposal. Judged by neo-Aristotelian standards, or by deliberative standards such as those utilized by Ivie (1987),

the plan was a failure in its apparant goal of achieving the implementation of the U.S. plan for disarmament in the international community. Evaluating the speech in terms of its effects on its immediate audience and its ability to bring about a particular policy of international control yields a negative verdict for the Baruch Plan. However, the speech is moving, similar to the Coatsville Address in being unsuccessful in the short run but still worthy of study; "moving enough so that the bare calculation of its immediate effects is insufficient to account for it, moving enough so that the contemporary reader cannot feel its power as having been spent" on its 1946 audience (Black, 1978, p. 83). To understand the manner in which the speech lives, it is important to view the Baruch Plan from a different perspective. The Baruch Plan can be seen as a success when placed in a generic framework which includes epideictic, as well as deliberative elements -- the jeremiadic perspective.

### **Chapter Three: The Jeremiad as Rhetorical Form**

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a generic framework for examining the Baruch Plan. The chapter describes the rhetorical genre of the Jeremiad, explains how jeremiads function rhetorically, and suggests standards by which jeremiadic texts should be judged. Jamieson defines genre as signifying a "distinct species, form, type, or kind" of discourse (1973, p. 162). The notion of genre suggests that certain types of works share characteristics independent of their authors or times of creation. A rhetorical genre embraces "discourses which share substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1978, p. 20). One genre of rhetoric that has been identified is the jeremiad.

#### **Background**

Bercovitch describes the American jeremiad as a "mode of public exhortation that originated in the European pulpit, was transformed in both form and content by the New England Puritans, persisted through the eighteenth century, and helped sustain a national dream through two hundred years of turbulence and change" (1978, p. xi). The jeremiad began as a political sermon. The Puritans believed that they were a chosen people led to a promised land on a mission from God. As a people ordained to progress, they required a conceptual mechanism to understand and integrate the trials and travails of the New World. The answer was the jeremiad:

a "new rhetorical form among the sermons of the Puritan preachers" in the seventeenth century (Bormann, 1977, p. 131).

In these sermons, the clergy portrayed calamity as something sent by God to punish or instruct the community when sins threatened their mission. The people were "exhorted" to "get right with God" (Ritter, 1980, p. 157). As chosen people with a special purpose, problems or calamities could be seen as undermining their progress or leading the chosen astray. Having a "special relationship to God as a chosen people" they were warned that they "must face disaster if they did not turn back from corruption to live by the national covenant" (Ritter, 1980, p. 157). Calamity was explained by the jeremiads as a test of the community's dedication and resolve. The assurance of the jeremiad was that recommitment by the community would lead to God lifting the punishment.

The minister in the jeremiad was not only a prophet apart from the community "a voice in the wilderness -- but who was at the same time a part of the community" (Ritter, 1980, p. 157). In the Puritan jeremiads, the "spokesmen shared in the sins of their society. They were very much a part of the established order; often they were political and social leaders as well as religious ones" (Ritter, 1980, p. 158). These Jeremiahs were a part of the community but also respected leaders of the social order.

### **Form of the Jeremiad**

Typically, the Puritan jeremiad followed a "rigid



organizational pattern" (Ritter, 1980, p. 157) which identified a sin or sins as the cause or source of the troubles or calamity and then provided a penitent solution. In form, the Puritan jeremiad first "presented a Scriptural precedent that should serve as the communal norm" (Johannesen, 1985, p. 158). The label jeremiad is derived from the frequent use of the Old Testament prophet Jeremiah in the citing of Scripture in the sermon. Second, the jeremiad "condemned in detail the fallen state of the community in breaking the covenant" (Johannesen, 1985, p. 158). The people were told that they had sinned; had fallen as a community by breaking their "special covenant with God in faith or in deed" (Ritter, 1980, p. 158). The minister would suggest that the present was characterized by "evils that God was visiting upon His people as punishment" (Ritter, 1980, p. 158). Third, the people were "called upon the realize their errors and to repent -- to restore their part of the covenant with God and to return to the true principles of the church before it was too late" (Ritter, 1980, p. 158). Finally, the people were told that God would remove the punishment if they acted and they were "offered a prophetic vision of an ideal future, of the good things to come" (Johannesen, 1985, p. 158). Thus by taking the action that the minister suggested, the community could expect the lifting of God's punishment and "the fulfillment of God's promise to His people -- the restoration of progress for the people under special and divine protection" (Ritter, 1980, p. 158).

Over time, the jeremiad as a rhetorical form has proven to be highly flexible. As a form it survived the demise of the Puritan theocracy and was used by both Rebels and Tories during the Revolution. By use of the jeremiad, the Rebels could see the revolution as God using the British to test the resolve and courage of the colonists, their ability to stand up for themselves. The Tories, on the other hand could see the rebellion as a punishment from God for the impieties of the colonists. Gradually, the "God" of Puritan Jeremiahs became the more secularized "Providence" or "History" of their descendents. Carpenter has identified an "historical jeremiad," a secular treatise which asks its audience to see themselves as a chosen people "confronted with a timely if not urgent warning that unless a certain course of atoning action is followed dire consequences will follow" (1978, p. 104). Like the Puritan jeremiad, the characteristics of a historical jeremiad include introductions and conclusions which evoke "feelings of impending doom," the claim that "adoption of a specific policy would insure continued well-being and ultimate salvation," and a permeating vision or "second persona" of a "model for the reader as part of a chosen people" (Carpenter, 1978, p. 113).

Johannesen describes a modern or secular jeremiad which also depicts "Americans as unique or 'chosen' people and envision[s] America as a promised land with a special destiny. . ." (1985, p. 160). In the modern jeremiad, "present social ills or the crisis situation

at hand are depicted as urgent, as requiring action, redemption, and reform before it is too late, as representing the verge of impending doom, and as a sign of breaking commitment to the fundamental principles of the American dream" (1985, p. 161).

In his analysis of presidential nomination acceptance speeches, Ritter finds that the jeremiad's theme remains "fundamentally intact: Americans are warned that they have deviated from the abiding principles of the American Dream; their present suffering is a sign of their infidelity to the past." In the jeremiad, the people are offered a path "through repentance back to their fundamental national values" which would "restore America to its former greatness. Like the Puritan form, the modern jeremiad both laments America's present condition and celebrates the prospect of its ultimate fulfillment" (1980, p. 158-9).

### **Functions of the Jeremiad**

Although it has been sufficiently flexible over 200 years to be adapted to different community needs and to the more secularized context of modern American culture, the jeremiad's four basic functions have not changed. First, the jeremiad functions to help "define (and redefine)" the meaning of the past (Ritter, 1980, p. 164). The jeremiad reminds the audience of community norms, of their status as special people with a particular mission or destiny. By reminding the audience of the relevant past it provides a perspective on the present and also "stands as a bridge between the past and the

future, charting the course to future glory by calling for fidelity to old ideals" (Ritter, 1980, p. 164).

Second, the jeremiad serves to "interpret and define the present" (Ritter, 1980, p. 167). As a rhetorical form, the jeremiad "accounts for a time of troubles (evil)" (Bormann, 1977, p.130), so that present problems are seen in the context of the past. The jeremiad suggests a movement from past to present, from "the ideal of community to [an explanation of] the shortcomings of community life" (Bercovitch, 1978, p. 16).

The third rhetorical function of jeremiads is to adjust "the political policies of the present with the ideals of the past" (Ritter, 1980, p. 167). Jeremiads interpret the present situation as a sin or error on the part of the community, but also portray present events as offering the chance for change and recommitment to positive values or covenants of the community by "stressing the ways in which calamities, adversities, and sins provide opportunities for redemption, restoration, and progress" (Johannessen, 1985, p. 159). As such, "the jeremiad has the potential to provide a powerful impetus to action and reform" (Bormann, 1977, p. 132). The account of the past and present is used to "impel" the community to action (Bormann, 1977, p. 130). The jeremiad moves the audience through a renewed understanding of the past and present "forward, with prophetic assurance, toward a resolution that incorporates (as it transforms) both the promise and the condemnation" of the

community's actions (Bercovitch, 1978, p. 16). The jeremiad was thus not merely a condemnation of the community (Johannesen, 1985, p. 161). While decrying the sins of the present, the jeremiad is optimistic, holding out the prospect of "redemption, promise, and progress" (Johannesen, 1985, p. 159). The aim of the jeremiad is "correction more than simply destruction" (Johannesen, 1985, p. 159), reflecting the "historic Jeremiah's role both of castigating apostasy and of heralding a bright future" (Johannesen, 1985, p. 159). A final function of the jeremiad is to "promote social cohesion" in the community or audience (Ritter, 1980, p. 167). The account given of the past and present serves as "a basis to unify the community" (Bormann, 1977, p. 130). By calling on the audience to renew its commitment to past ideals and to rededicate itself to completing its mission, "the modern secular jeremiad. . . also functions to promote social cohesion." The jeremiad "fosters a sense of community and national unity" by reference to a "common cultural memory which unifies the past and future" (Johannesen, 1985, p.161). By referring to promises and ideals of the past and positing a brighter future, the audience experiences an "anticipatory sense of a relevant destiny" (Carpenter, 1978, p. 106). Often, the audience is presented with a "rhetorical vision" of a model person -- an "abstraction personified as a character" which has characteristics or holds values that the rhetor would have his audience share in common. This model person, or second persona,

provides the example which the audience should emulate thereby providing the "means by which the audience could insure its continued well-being and ultimate salvation" (Carpenter, 1978, p. 110).

The jeremiad as a rhetorical form posits a transcendent view of community. The consensus called for is one of "calling and enterprise" rather than "national tradition or genealogical patterns; and it implies a form of community without geographical boundaries" (Johannesen, 1985, p. 26). Be they members of a religious group, citizens of a particular nation, or of the world at large, the jeremiad challenges the audience to see itself as a unified community.

The form and functions of the jeremiad genre suggest that it shares elements of both the deliberative and epideictic classifications of rhetoric. The deliberative classification of rhetoric contains discourse which seeks to change policy. Aristotle calls deliberative that rhetoric which seeks to "either exhort or to dissuade" action (1926, I, ch. 2, 1358b). It prescribes a future action by making a judgment about what should be done; it defines a course of action for the audience. Epideictic rhetoric is rhetoric of praise or blame. In it one finds the "demonstration of the honorable or the shameful" (Kennedy, 1980, p. 73).

Deliberative and epideictic rhetoric often function together, as deliberative rhetoric calls for action and epideictic rhetoric

"strengthens the disposition toward action by increasing adherence to the values it lauds" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 50). An audience will not act on a policy without the values which provide a foundation for policy choices. Aristotle acknowledges that deliberative and epideictic rhetoric need each other: "Praise and counsels have a common aspect, for what you might suggest in counseling becomes encomium by a change in the phrase" (1926, I, ch. 9, 1368a). Deliberative choices, then, rest upon the values supported by epideictic elements.

The genre of the jeremiad contains elements of both deliberative and epideictic rhetoric. The jeremiad calls for action by presenting a policy for the audience, but it also acts to praise and blame by basing the request for that action upon the creation of a disposition to act. It decries the current situation of sin on the basis of failure to adhere to the values of the past. It praises with a vision of who the audience can become and lauds the values of the past while it damns the failure of the audience to uphold those values. Therefore, a jeremiad creates a context in which a policy can be chosen or action can be taken by exhorting the audience to adopt or reaffirm certain values.

Identifying a genre allows the critic to recognize standards by which discourse within that genre should be evaluated. Mohrmann and Leff, in their rationale for neo-classical criticism, argue that the "immediate advantage" of describing a genre is that it "points to

intrinsic standards for judging a particular kind of discourse" (1974, p. 463). The standards for judging a text, then, should be appropriate to the genre to which the text belongs; the relevant issue is whether the speech fulfills the demands of its genre. The rhetorical form and functions of the jeremiad suggest standards of judgment by which jeremiadic texts should be evaluated.

The first function, defining the past, suggests that the rhetor's goal is to create a compelling story or narrative which encapsulates history by reference to social values and communal ideals. The jeremiad involves an interpretation of the community's heritage. This interpretation is not reporting historical "facts", but creating the history and defining the community identity in order to justify the vision of the future later presented. "Because present policies are measured against the standards" of the past, "a people's vision of their past dictates their present purpose" (Ritter, 1980, p. 165). The test of individual discourse for this function is whether the rhetor's vision of the past captures the attention of the audience and lends itself to the reproduction of this vision by the audience.

The second function of the jeremiad is to interpret and define the present in light of the past and the values to which the audience subscribes. As such, the rhetor must explain the problems or sins of the present situation in a manner which accounts for the evil by referring to the community's past commitment to certain values and trying to prevent neglect of those same values.



The third function of the jeremiad is to redeem and restore traditional values. The rhetor must provide a mechanism by which the audience can escape the calamity. The rhetor suggests a vision of what kind of persons the audience can become, and how such persons would act. The action to be taken must be justified in terms of rewards of the future. The audience must believe that the harms justify the action and that the future will be better for having acted.

Finally, the jeremiad creates social cohesion in the audience. The rhetor creates social cohesion by helping the audience see itself as a community with a common past, bound together in the present troubles, and promised an ultimate fulfillment. In doing so, "the speaker tries to establish a sense of communion centered around particular values recognized by the audience" and to tie the action proposed to the ideals and values of the community (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 51). Further, jeremiads often create cohesion by positing a second persona -- an implied auditor or "model of what the rhetor would have his real auditor become" (Black, 1970, p. 113). Jeremiads then can be appraised by critical judgments of the image the rhetor would have his audience embody as well as how effectively the rhetor creates a sense of community.

Jeremiads may be judged in terms of how well they fulfill their functions. Because jeremiads contain both epideictic and deliberative elements, such judgments should assess the action called for in a given jeremiad, as well as the values which are

praised or damned. Furthermore, because the Jeremiah represents a distinct kind of rhetorical persona, special attention should be accorded speaker ethos. The Jeremiah speaks as a prophet, exhorting the people to recognize that they have strayed and to recommit themselves to a set of values by acting to atone for sins. If the prophet is proven "right" over time; if the warnings are borne out by future events, then the rhetor's goal of defining the past and interpreting the future is met. The nature of prophecy is to predict the future. By definition, a Jeremiah is ahead of his or her time; a voice crying in the wilderness. Jeremiadic discourse is distinct from other calls for policy change in that choosing the proposal entails accepting a more extreme view of the present and the future than ordinary policy options. Also, a prophet's vision may be only understood over time. If another, less immediate audience to a jeremiad takes heed of the warnings in time and acts, then the rhetor can be said to be successful in fulfilling the functions of jeremiadic discourse. Consequently, jeremiadic discourse should be evaluated by standards more sensitive to the role of the rhetor and the passage of time than typical deliberative rhetoric.

Assessing a jeremiad involves judging it by how it fulfills the functions of the genre. A jeremiad functions to define the past and present, provide an opportunity for redemption, and create social cohesion. A sensitivity to the role of the rhetor as prophet suggests that the functions of the jeremiad discussed above can be evaluated

in, as well as over, time, in that the intensity of adherence to values is increased in such a way to "set in motion the intended action" or to create in hearers a "willingness to act which will appear" at a future time (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 45). This affords the critic the ability to make judgments about a text which are consistent with and appropriate to the genre in which the discourse is situated and to see the manner in which the discourse is influential over time.

## **Chapter Four: The Baruch Plan and the Nuclear Jeremiad**

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Baruch Plan from a jeremiadic perspective. It argues that the Baruch Plan can be usefully viewed from the perspective of the jeremiad genre. An examination of the Baruch Plan informed by the characteristics of the jeremiadic tradition suggests that the speech shares features with the jeremiad and fulfills the cultural functions of the jeremiad. This chapter argues further that the Baruch Plan also extends the jeremiad into the nuclear era, representing a new "sub-genre" which can usefully be labeled the "nuclear jeremiad."

The approach taken in this chapter is that of generic criticism. Generic criticism uses the standards of form/function peculiar to a given genre to provide "critical illumination" of a text. Critical insights to a text are the result of "systematic, close textual analysis" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1978, p. 18). Generic criticism is the "measurement of the text against a pre-existing mode" (Campbell & Jamieson, 1978, p. 16). Also referred to as "generic participation," Harrell and Linkugel explain this process as "determining what speeches participate in which genres. Procedurally, this involves the testing of an instance of discourse in question against the generic description" (1978, p. 275). Ritter's examination of Presidential nomination acceptance addresses utilizes this method: "a kind of parallel case or analogic process

which compares one type of discourse. . . with the chief characteristics and functions of a well-established rhetorical genre (the Puritan jeremiad)" (1980, p. 157).

The theme of Baruch's speech is that the human race faces death unless humanity can reject nuclear weapons. Baruch urges his audience to see the current situation as dangerous and to view the human race as on a path to destruction which can be avoided only by adopting a plan of international control of nuclear weapons. By turning back, the future can be bright and free from the dangers of the present. In other words, Baruch, in the best jeremiadic tradition, stresses first, the problem facing the world, second, the opportunity for escape, and third a vision of salvation for the future. The sections that follow illustrate that Baruch's speech is characteristic of a jeremiad in both form and function.

### **The Urgent Problem**

Baruch sets a tone of urgency by calling his topic "the subject of life itself" (All quotations unless otherwise indicated are from Baruch, 1946). Although the international climate of fear hardly made it necessary, Baruch makes the claim that nuclear weapons threaten the survival of humankind. He characterizes the choice as one between "the quick and the dead." The nuclear age is a "black portent" which holds the world "slave to fear." Because "science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its proportions that our minds cower from the terror it creates," the future holds "world

destruction." These times are times of "peril" and "heart stopping fears which now beset the world." Baruch warns of a "famine in the world today" which "starves" humanity's "hunger of the spirit." The people of the world "hate war" which is a "menace to all" and is a "devastation" and "degradation" in which "victor, vanquished, and neutral" are all affected. He stresses that the people have a "longing" for peace and urgently need to turn away from the "dread power" against which there is no "adequate defense." The dread power is a "baleful" instrument used for "death." He warns of the "devilish program" of "dread secret weapons" which takes the world back into the "Dark Ages" into "Chaos." This period of "gloom" and "hopelessness" is to be seen as a "fiery trial." Baruch wants his audience to believe that the present is horrible, that death is "the price of war" and that it must act quickly for "to delay may be to die."

With these claims Baruch's speech functions as a jeremiad by defining the past and present, establishing the urgency of the problems to motivate his audience to act, and attempting to build cohesion in his audience. First, the past that Baruch portrays is not that of value-free science making progress but the fiendish tearing or stealing of a secret which is the "miracle of the atom." He wants the audience to see the past as a mistake and the present as the punishment humankind is faced with for having created the dreadful weapons.

Second, Baruch defines and interprets the present. He paints a frightening picture of the current situation with vivid imagery of the horrors of nuclear destruction. Like the classic Jeremiah he characterizes through either/or language the urgency of the situation. Baruch employs antithesis heavily in the speech by making the problem of nuclear control one of only two choices, one clearly to be preferred to the other. The choice is between "World Peace or World Destruction," "death" or life, "courage or cowardice," "fear" or "hope," "Cosmos" or "Chaos," "good" or "evil," and finally, "pain" and "peace" or "death" and "war." Baruch makes it clear what he insists is at stake. He makes the option of his coming solution appear obvious. Baruch suggests that his audience stands "at a pivotal point in time," presented with only two choices. This makes it more likely that the audience will act since he creates a "sense of urgency and impending doom" so that his audience will find his solution meaningful and necessary (Carpenter, 1978, p. 105).

Third, Baruch creates a sense of community and social cohesion. While he acknowledges that the U.S. is the nation in which nuclear weapons came to "fruition," the finger he points is at the abstract, general, supra-national concept of "Science." Human enterprise has caused the harm; "science has taught us how to put the atom to work." He also argues that the world as a whole is being punished and threatened with death. When he claims that war affects everyone "victor and vanquished and neutral alike," no one

can "escape war's devastation," and vividly portrays the terrors and destruction of nuclear weapons he draws the audience together into a commonly threatened whole. He stresses throughout that everyone wants peace and that the people of the world desire an end to fear. He addresses his speech not merely to the Commission, but to his "fellow citizens of the world."

### **A Way to Escape the Problem**

Baruch's second theme is the need for the audience to adopt his solution of international control of nuclear weapons. In his proposal he suggests that the world will find "hope which with faith can work salvation" for the world. The world must "elect world peace" and find a "meeting of the minds and the hearts" of the people. He claims that "only in the will of mankind lies the answer." Thus the people are told that if only they will act, they can forge their redemption, and "provide the mechanism to assure" the world safety and freedom from fear and destruction by precluding the use of nuclear weapons in war. The audience is called upon to "answer" the "demands" for peace. If the "world will join in a pact" to "build a workable plan" and "erect a safeguard," then it will find salvation. He reminds his audience that it must act because it is "consecrated" to ending the threat of war. He spells out the specifics of the United States' plan without great elaboration and in a simple, plain style distinct from the rest of the speech.

In these claims, Baruch provides the audience with a means to



repent. His policy can be their salvation. His words are aimed at fulfilling the third function of jeremiads: showing the audience how they can atone for their sins. He aligns policy routes with his previous interpretation of the past and the present. He has proven that nuclear weapons are awful and that humankind must act. He sets forth his proposal and then seeks to demonstrate that it is the best way for humans to undo what they have done. He also answers two potential objections to his plan by arguing first, that words without sanctions are useless and second, that the veto power must be suspended. Baruch claims that "penalization is essential" because "simple renunciation" of weapons has failed in the past. Thus we need "enforceable sanctions," "condign punishment" (punishment in kind), and "an international law with teeth in it," not merely "pious thoughts." He appeals to the "common good," "public opinion," and a "world movement toward security" to justify the strict enforcement mechanisms he proposes. He claims that the the matter of punishment "goes straight to the veto power" and that there can be no veto power because "the bomb does not wait upon debate." The "imperative speed" required for punishment given the nature of nuclear weapons is a basis to justify suspension of the veto power in this case.

In his explanation of the plan Baruch also uses the past and the immediate context as proof for the legitimacy of action. Baruch uses an "historical approach" to buttress his argument for sanctions.

First he argues that punishment is justified by the historical efforts at punishment employed by the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union at Nuremberg. He also cites the General Assembly of the United Nations mandate that created the UNAEC which calls for "effective safeguards," and finally cites the conference attended by the U.S., the U.K, and the U.S.S.R in December of 1945 in the statements of which Baruch finds "implicit" justification for "the process of prevention and penalization."

### **A Vision of the Future**

Baruch makes clear that he knows that his plan will be difficult to impletment. The "way is thorny" and humans must act with "hope," "faith," and "courage" in order to lift nuclear power from "use in death to use for life." The means of redemption are severe, but so is the sin humanity must pay for. The future holds "salvation" and is characterized by "peace" and "security." This life is "a new life free from fear" and "the fulfillment of the aspirations of mankind." This pattern of "world salvation" is a "fairer, surer" life of peace. He encourages the audience to believe that human enterprise can also "produce with will and faith the miracle of peace," and eliminate war itself by providing a "guarantee of safety." Rather than Chaos, this new life is "Cosmos." With international cooperation peace can be "tranquil and secure" rather than a "feverish interlude between wars." By acting to atone, the audience can "stand erect with their faces to the sun" rather than "burrowing

into the ground like rats." They may face "pain as the price of peace" but it will be worth it to avoid "death as the price of war." He encourages the audience to believe that the "path" to salvation "grows brighter" by their action and that they can expect a world which is safer, not paralyzed by fear, and characterized by peace and cooperation.

Baruch's vision of the future helps to make his audience willing to persevere in their actions, and holds out a reward (the lifting of the current punishment) if only it has the courage to act. He also creates social cohesion by characterizing the future as cooperatively fashioned human salvation. The world acts together and is rewarded together. Baruch ends his speech by paraphrasing Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address. He reminds his listeners that they "cannot escape history," that they will face honor or dishonor depending on their choice. They know how to "save peace" and must face the world's praise or condemnation for their actions. They can choose to "nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth."

Baruch as a speaker embodies the characteristics of the classic Jeremiah. He speaks as a part of the community and thus shares in its sin, yet he also speaks as a prophet, urging the community to recognize their error. His character at the time of his appointment to the U.N.A.E.C. was above reproach and he was a highly respected voice of the established political order.

Baruch's speech is a jeremiad. It identifies a sin and condemns

the fallen community, provides an action the audience can take which atones for the sin and allows them to repent, and it offers a vision of what the world will be like after the lifting of the punishment. He warns the audience that it must act or the consequences will be dire and creates a sense of impending doom. Throughout he offers a "second persona" - a vision of what he would have his audience be. He makes this clear by telling the audience that some will see in his plan "only emptiness. Each of us carries his own mirror in which is reflected hope--or determined desperation--courage or cowardice." He wants the audience to be hopeful, faithful, and courageous, and also willing to sacrifice and work together toward salvation. As befits the rhetorical demands of a jeremiad, Baruch's speech defines the past, interprets the present, offers a solution, and promotes social cohesion.

### **The Nuclear Jeremiad**

Campbell and Jamieson suggest that generic criticism is useful because it allows the critic to point out differences in texts as well as similarities. The genre of the jeremiad has been identified as at work throughout many generations. As discussed in Chapter Three, the jeremiad has undergone changes in its history -- evolving to meet the rhetorical needs of a nation struggling for independence and coping with its changing mission and destiny. This indicates that "while traditional genres may color rhetoric, they do not ossify it" (Jamieson, 1973, p. 168).

Viewed not as a "static" form but an "evolving" phenomenon (Jamieson, 1973, p. 168), the genre of the jeremiad has developed a flexibility over time while still maintaining its essential characteristics. The Baruch Plan is characteristic of traditional jeremiads but also demonstrates how the genre has evolved. In three important respects, the Baruch Plan may be characterized as a new sort of jeremiad, a jeremiad tuned to the exigencies of a nuclear and increasingly interdependent world -- the nuclear jeremiad.

#### Nuclear Weapons and Scientific Sin

The nature of nuclear weapons suggests that the "sin" posited in the nuclear jeremiad is a scientific sin. The sin is a technological sin which is the product of science and human invention. This presents the rhetor of a nuclear jeremiad with particular problems. Scientific problems often lend themselves to scientific solution, and are difficult to transport into the moral realm. The rhetor must present an interpretation of the present and vision of the future which transcends technical concerns by drawing the audience and the issues onto moral ground. Baruch blames Science for the problem but notes that Science cannot provide the solution since, although in the past Science provided a defense for every weapon that created terror, we now "face a condition in which adequate defense does not exist." He answers the possibility that technology can solve the problem and move to the conclusion that

putting the atom to work for good "lies in the domain dealing with the principles of human duty." Baruch's warning and vision make it clear that this scientific problem is a problem "more of ethics than of physics." By focusing his speech on humans having to act together out of moral duty, and by sandwiching the technical specifics of his proposal between moral claims, Baruch is able to transport the problem out of the laboratory and into the moral realm.

Also, a scientific-technological sin means that the relationship between the source of evil and the source of action is more complex in a nuclear jeremiad. This may make it difficult for action to be taken since the action may be beyond the audience's and rhetor's control and power. In traditional jeremiads, the audience could take direct action, such as being chaste, or pious, or working harder, more easily than in the nuclear age, when the public may not have sufficient power to act despite their conviction. For example, if Baruch succeeded in convincing people that international control was the solution to the nuclear threat, but their action could not stop the already ongoing development of nuclear weapons in another country, then their conviction would be insufficient given the extra-textual phenomenon. Boyer tempers his regret at the "failure" of the Baruch Plan by wondering "was any other outcome possible. . . . Was international control ever in the cards at a time when the Soviet Union was working feverishly to build its own atomic bomb? Probably not" (1985, p. 56). This suggests that in the nuclear

jeremiad the action called for may be quite complicated and assessments need to take into account phenomena outside of the audience's control.

Similarly, the audience may not perceive itself as having the power to act and thus may be more likely to defer to scientific or technological expertise. Public opinion polls conducted in 1946 suggest that the audience to the Baruch Plan was influenced by a lack of belief in their power to act and imply that the nuclear jeremiad, by its very subject, entails a difficulty for the audience to perceive their power. The nature of the nuclear threat engenders a degree of fatalism in the public; "the very magnitude of the danger" may lead people to "deny it [nuclear war] a place among the issues" the public spends time "consciously worrying about" (Boyer, 1985, p. 23). Nuclear issues are also often met with a generalized faith in "the inexhaustibility of scientific invention" and a heavy "reliance on 'the authorities.'" Coupled with a lack of information and a belief that the business of nuclear weapons goes on above people's heads and is a matter appropriate for the experts and the leaders to decide, nuclear issues make it difficult for the public to perceive that they have power to act. Given the complication involved in the relationship between the sin and the atoning action requested, the rhetor in the nuclear jeremiad must create a sense of empowerment for the audience. Baruch accomplishes this by providing a broad overview of the issues, by placing the matter in a meaningful

context of human will and human action. He allows the audience to see the implications of alternative courses of action and provides for them a way of seeing the threat of nuclear weapons as one that can be solved by all humans dedicating themselves to peace and beginning a process of peace which Baruch likens to a person "learning to say 'A'" and then being able to learn the rest of the alphabet as well.

### Nuclear Weapons and the Future

The transgenerational nature of nuclear weapons suggests that a nuclear jeremiad is enlarged in time. The threat posed by the sin in a nuclear jeremiad is the punishment of future generations as well as the present. Nuclear weapons doom the audience and its posterity. As such the rhetor speaks over, as well as in, time. He or she must address future generations. Baruch acknowledges this concept in the speech by noting that the choices taken will "light" the audience down "to the latest generation" in either honor or dishonor. The Baruch Plan is a speech that is not easily dated. With the exception of references to specific world leaders that would allow the reader to place the speech in time, this speech is a speech that could have been given in 1966, 1986, or, if things continue as they are, 1996. Also, Baruch's use of archetypal metaphors allows him to speak over time. Baruch casts the choice facing humanity as "death" or "life," "cosmos" or "chaos," "light" or "dark" -- terms which are persuasive throughout time and are not likely to change



with alterations in specific international policy. Baruch's language choices are not blandly vague, but timeless in their gravity, allowing him to successfully address himself to the future; adapting to the unique demands of a nuclear jeremiad.

### Nuclear Weapons and the Community

The nature of nuclear weapons broadens the nature of community appealed to and thus the jeremiad is enlarged in space. In the nuclear jeremiad, the concept of community is expanded to global dimensions. The early jeremiads referred to the spiritual and national family of the Puritans, and other jeremiads referred to political alliances and the national mission of the American Dream. In each of these cases, the concept of family and community includes "the notion of some founder shared in common, or some covenant or constitution or historical act from which the group is derived" (Burke, 1945, p. 29).

In the nuclear jeremiad the community and family appealed to is the family of all humanity. The world and all its people are threatened and the world is called upon to act together to bring about salvation. This concept of community transcends what Baruch decries as "narrow sovereignty." This is appropriate since nuclear weapons are characterized by Baruch as the fruit of Science (and not a particular nation), threatening every person regardless of nationality or alliance, and only able to be controlled through international cooperation. Rather than merely ask for cooperation

and unity, Baruch's arguments demand it, as he claims that the specter of nuclear war forcefully binds humans together in terror at a common enemy. None can "escape war's devastation." All are affected "physically, economically, and morally." The nature of foreign policy is changed by the "new age" of nuclear capability, he argues, since anything which threatens peace anywhere, at any time, "concerns each and all of us." For Baruch, the only alternative to international cooperation is "international disintegration."

In addition to drawing the international community together to fight a common enemy, Baruch appeals to a variety of cultures through his use of archetypal myth. A "secret," "torn from nature" threatens destruction. Action can lead the world to "salvation" which will lift humans from "death to [a new] life." His language reminds the audience of the Eden-myth in which Eve ate of fruit from the forbidden tree of knowledge and brought sin to humankind. This sin can be atoned for and salvation can be found. Baruch reminds his audience that his plan holds the promise of "redemption:" "It is for us to accept, or to reject -- if we dare, this doctrine of salvation. It springs from stark necessity, and that is inexorable" (in Rosenbloom, 1953, p. 285-7). Baruch's references to sin and the turning to a life of salvation are capable of eliciting strong feelings from a wide variety of cultures; enabling him to appeal to the international community to which he speaks.

Baruch is speaking in an international body, created with the

purpose of providing collective security and facilitating international peace and cooperation. He must appeal to the spirit of the United Nations which is the covenant binding nations together and to which he claims the audience is "consecrated." He is thus true to his mandate; not only true to the reality of nuclear weapons. In the nuclear jeremiad, the rhetor must bind a diverse world together to create a sense of global community.

The Baruch Plan has been demonstrated to participate in the genre of the jeremiad and, because it treats of nuclear weapons -- containing a technological sin, transgenerational effects, and a broadened community -- is shown to contain distinct characteristics that allow the Baruch Plan to be usefully described as a nuclear jeremiad.

## **Chapter Five: Critical Assessment**

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical assessment of the Baruch Plan based upon insights gained by a jeremiadic perspective. In Chapter One I proposed that by viewing the Baruch Plan from the critical perspective of the jeremiad, significant insight can be made into the speech and into a particular genre of nuclear discourse. Previous chapters have demonstrated that the speech can appropriately be viewed as a jeremiad. This chapter discusses the critical insights and implications that flow from this view with respect to the speech and the genre of the nuclear jeremiad.

### **Judging the Baruch Plan: The Need for a Generic Perspective**

As previously noted, conventional assessments of the Baruch Plan would be negative. For example, the common neo-Aristotelian view which focuses solely upon immediate effects would find that the speech failed to garner sufficient support to lead to the adoption of the policy of international control that Baruch advocates and thus judge the speech a failure. An important recent refinement in effects-oriented textual criticism is Ivie's metaphoric analysis of nuclear discourse (1987). This section explicates Ivie's method and applies it to the Baruch Plan to illustrate that even the application of a valuable, theoretically subtle tool (such as metaphoric analysis) absent an appropriate generic framework ignores

important insights available to the critic.

### Ivie and Metaphor

Ivie seeks to identify "sources of rhetorical invention that have undermined" attempts to alter perspectives toward the Soviet Union and create an atmosphere more conducive to slowing or halting the arms race (1987, p. 166). He claims that examining the use of metaphor in the rhetoric of Henry Wallace, J. William Fulbright and Helen Caldicot (three critics of the enemy-image of the Soviet Union), reveals a collective failure to find a successful image to transcend the vision of "a barbarian foe bent upon destroying the United States" (1987, p. 168).

Ivie presents a five step process as a method to identify metaphorical concepts. First, a critic becomes familiar with the rhetor's written or spoken text[s] and context in order to "create a sense of the complete experience before attending to its particulars" (1987, p. 167). Second, the critic selects an example of the rhetor's work and identifies "vehicles" of metaphor used by the rhetor. A vehicle is a term "from one domain of meaning [which] acts upon a subject. . . from another domain" (1987, p. 166). Ivie suggests that each vehicle and its immediate context be marked and filed in some manner so to "reduce the original text to an abridged version that comprises only marked vehicles and their immediate contexts" (1987, p. 167). Third, the critic arranges the vehicles into groups by entailment. Each group, or "cluster," represents a

metaphorical concept. For instance, Ivie identifies one cluster in Wallace's rhetoric which he calls the "GAME cluster comprising terms such as 'game,' 'race,' 'cards,' 'competition,' 'play,' 'vie,' 'pawn,' and 'team' " (p. 169). The fourth step is to search the text for every occurrence of the vehicles in each cluster. Finally, the list is analyzed for "patterns of usage within and between clusters" so to assess the effectiveness of the metaphors guiding the rhetor's invention (1987, p.169).

Ivie suggests that Wallace, Fulbright and Caldicot failed to effect political change because their metaphors "placed the blame for the problem and the responsibility for its solution" solely on the U.S. (1987, p.172), and lacked a characterization of the Soviets that could assure the public of the Soviet Union's ability to act cooperatively and with good will. He concludes that the metaphorical concepts chosen are "self defeating" because they blame the United States alone and have not been able to transcend the public's conviction reinforced by Cold War rhetoric that the Soviet Union is savage.

Ivie argues that "some kind of a SYMBIOSIS metaphor must be identified and elaborated in order to move beyond the peril" of nuclear weapons (1987, p. 181). He characterizes this metaphor as one that 1) "identifies a common external enemy" of the superpowers; 2) "encompasses the superpowers within the same system" to further the ideal of "mutual security" while transcending

the ideals of communism or democracy; 3) accounts for countries not being wholly good or evil, but being both "rational and irrational, aggressive and pacific, competitive and cooperative, independent and interdependent;" and 4) provides a "basis for trust" (1987, p. 180). Such metaphor is a "mechanism of invention," he argues, that is needed but not in evidence. An examination of the Baruch Plan suggests that perhaps this transcendent, replacement metaphor of symbiosis was present at the dawn of the nuclear age.

#### Metaphor and the Baruch Plan

Using Ivie's method to examine the Baruch Plan reveals seven clusters of vehicles. Baruch's use of metaphor suggests that Unity and Faith can, with Work and a Journey, lead humankind to Light and Strength and away from Fear. First, Baruch claims that Fear besets the world. A "portent" of "terror" causes humans to "cower" at the "baleful," "dread power" of nuclear weapons which "menace" the world with "heart-stopping fears." Baruch characterizes the situation as one of extreme fear to both underscore the threat of nuclear weapons - to make clear that the choice is "between the quick and the dead" - and to encourage acceptance of his plan. This fear menaces the entire world; all people are threatened by nuclear weapons - "victor, vanquished, and neutral alike." War in the nuclear age, Baruch claims, affects "each and every one of us." In this manner, Baruch has drawn the world together, encompassing all countries into the same "system" that Ivie suggests.

The second cluster is the metaphors of Unity. Baruch warns that his audience must choose or "elect" "world" "cooperation" and peace, or "world" "disintegration" and "destruction." He calls on his "fellow citizens of the world" to work for the "common good." He suggests that they are members of a "body," the "fathers" of which condone and expect their action. He notes a "world movement" for peace and calls for a "meeting of the hearts and minds" of the people of the world. He urges his audience that in the "will of mankind" they can find "Cosmos" and avoid "Chaos." By calling for the world to act together against a threat to one and all, Baruch claims that countries coexist and should act interdependently and cooperatively, characteristic of Ivie's replacement metaphor.

This union of people is reminded by Baruch that they must have Faith, the third cluster of metaphors. Nuclear weapons are "devilish" and humans will be "damned" as slaves to fear if they do not have "faith" and the "will" to attain the "miracle" of peace which they are "consecrated" to achieve. Through unified, international control of nuclear weapons, humans will find a "new life" and "salvation."

The fourth cluster of images depicts a Journey which must be undertaken in unity and with faith. This is an "escape" along a "path" through a "tunnel." The "travelling" along this "way" is "long" but must be "followed" to the "end of the road." Baruch characterizes his plan as a "guerdon"--a goal. He warns his audience that it must



travel a long way to reach its destination: peace, tranquility, and the "fulfillment" of the aspirations of the world.

The fifth cluster of metaphors characterizes the present as Dark and the future as Light. Nuclear weapons make things "black" and "dim." The world is in a "tunnel" of darkness and failure to control nuclear weapons may lead them into the "Dark Ages." Baruch's plan or faithful journey will "light us down" in honor or dishonor. If the audience acts, the "light gets brighter" and it will see the "light at the end" of the tunnel. Baruch characterizes his plan as containing a "mirror" which "reflects" the dark "emptiness," or the bright courage and faith of each person's heart. If they do not act, the audience will "burrow into the earth like rats" rather than "stand with our faces to the sun." At the least, Baruch wants his plan to be "illuminating."

The sixth cluster of metaphors is found in Baruch's pragmatic call for the audience to Work or construct. He wants the world to find a "formula," "pattern," or "mechanism" with which to "erect" a "workable plan." Their "business" is to "produce" with "skill" the "building" of peace. In this way, humans can "put the atom to work" and "make it work for good." The atom will be "used" for life and will "work" for humans, rather than humans being the "slaves" of the atom.

Finally, Baruch characterizes his plan and the humans who undertake it by Strength rather than weakness. Humans weakly

"cower" before nuclear weapons and peace has thus far been only a "feverish interlude" between wars. Human strength is sapped by nuclear weapons, which are a "famine" that "starves" humans who "hunger" for a "secure" world. Baruch's plan challenges the world to have the "courage" to devise an international law "with teeth in it." Only with a "fortified" "safeguard" will humans make a "conquest" of fear, find a "cure" for their hunger, and find their faith "strengthened" and "deepened."

#### Implications of Applying Ivie's Method to the Baruch Plan

The language of the Baruch Plan provides the symbiosis that Ivie requests. First, Baruch identifies a common enemy, rather than blaming any particular person or nation. Nuclear weapons are something that has been "produced." He blames the abstract concept of "Science" for developing nuclear weapons. While he acknowledges that nuclear weapons were first developed by the United States, it is in a vague suggestion that they "reached fruition" there, as if they grew unaided. He asks that the world unite to "destroy this instrument" which further generalizes the concept and separates the action from controlling humans. In his call for quick action he warns that "the bomb does not wait," not that human passions or aggression is the issue. By these choices, Baruch chooses to point the finger at an enemy that all can blame - Science. Baruch identifies a common enemy, and by using the metaphors of unity and fear, he draws the world together into a single, united, cooperative

system that needs to act as a group in order to find salvation.

Baruch's language also provides a basis for cooperation and accounts for both sides of human nature through his metaphors of strength and work. His plan is a plan with "teeth" and a "workable" plan that encourages the audience to not merely have faith in the "pious" hopes of peace, but the "enforceable sanctions" of the community. His proposal emphasizes the need for punishment for those who would retreat from their commitment to renounce nuclear weapons. This allows him to account for the aggressive, irrational, competitive side of nations by acknowledging that "mere words" will not ensure peace, but that the force of law will. His rejection of the veto also serves this end. He accounts for the possibility that a competitive, aggressive, irrational country acting independently will try to veto the imposition of punishment on a violator of the international agreement. The practical tone of the speech which presents the specifics of the proposal makes it clear that Baruch is not offering platitudes and has a view of the world that takes account of antagonistic motives. Given the veto and sanction components of the proposal, Baruch is able to more credibly ask for the world's trust. He acknowledges and accounts for violation of the agreement, and thus nations can feel that there is substance to the proposal which justifies their trust and faith.

Ivie's claim is that the absence of the replacement metaphor accounts for the failure to curb the arms race. However, Baruch's

plan offers the vision through metaphor that Ivie seeks: it identifies a common enemy, unifies the parties involved, takes account of both negative and positive motives, and provides a basis for trust. It may be argued then, that by Ivie's standards, the Baruch Plan should have "worked" or succeeded but did not. If it meets Ivie's standards and did not "work," then Ivie's claims need to be reassessed. Perhaps use of metaphor is not as decisive a factor in altering the arms race as Ivie would hold. Certainly, extra-textual elements need to be considered. For instance, conviction does not necessarily lead to action and the Baruch Plan, while convincing a huge segment of the population to approve of international control, could not in itself provide empowerment necessary to achieve political action.

However, the claim that speeches or texts which contain the metaphor of symbiosis have not succeeded is misguided. A reconceptualization of what is meant by success and failure is in order given the jeremiadic framework within which the Baruch Plan belongs. If a critic identifies genre as purely deliberative, then immediate success and failure of policy proposals is an appropriate standard of judgment. However, if the Baruch Plan (or other discourse of the nuclear jeremiad) is epideictic as well, then judgments of success and failure of the speech and its metaphors are less clear-cut. Seeing the Baruch Plan as a jeremiad allows the critic to evaluate the speech over time, given the epideictic

functions of a jeremiad and the broader time-frame for success and failure.

### **Judging the Baruch Plan: The Value of the Jeremiadic Perspective**

The Baruch Plan can usefully be characterized as a nuclear jeremiad which possesses both epideictic and deliberative elements. As such, it can be judged as a successful speech. Baruch offers a vision of the world that speaks to us today. His audience is all generations that are held in the grip of nuclear weapons. The opportunity to embrace internationalism, faith, and cooperation, and to renounce nuclear weapons, is an opportunity that has remained. Although the risks of nuclear war have increased over time, the chance for choosing Baruch's plan is still available. If anything, his message rings more truly, and his warning sounds more clearly, each day that passes.

Baruch's speech provides a context which should be broadly construed and not merely seen in time. The context of the Baruch Plan is an audience of the entire world and a time measured by each day of the passing arms race. Its audience is every person who lives in a world with nuclear weapons and particularly "all of those who are interested in a meaningful interpretation of the history and moral status" of the world community (Black, 1978, p. 84).

The speech provides a moral interpretation of human folly and human potential which offers timeless insights. Each phase of the

arms race, every proposal accepted and rejected, every new call for peace, allows Baruch's insights and warnings to be more clearly perceived. Black describes the Coatsville Address in a manner which applies just as well to the Baruch Plan: "The passage of time, therefore, can only enable the audiences to this speech to apprehend its ramifications, to discern the range of its applicability, to explicate its complexities and absorb its overtones" (Black, 1978, p. 88). In 1946, Baruch's speech began a dialogue and process of arms control negotiations that have not ended. As long as there are nuclear weapons, the dialogue continues.

Not only does Baruch's speech still live and address itself to a contemporary audience, but the receptiveness of that audience to Baruch's words may grow over time. Given that the jeremiad entails prophecy warning of doom in the future, a jeremiad may only find its audience in the years that follow the warning. One can hope that Baruch's speech may continue to find "its understanding audience, and it may be that that audience will grow larger and more attentive with every passing day" (Black, 1978, p. 88).

Baruch's speech also educates the audience by shaping "the appropriate reaction" to the crisis of nuclear weapons (Black, 1978, p. 85). By placing the burden on all "citizens of the world," and demanding unity and action, Baruch makes indifference a difficult reaction in his readers. His arguments make clear that those who "remain detached" from the situation deny their responsibility for

action and embrace the cowardice and emptiness that Baruch damns. Baruch thus "forces the auditor to . . . examine his own relationship" to the problem, thereby reducing the possibility of "passive indifference" (Black, 1978, p. 85). The vivid, emotional, fearful language that Baruch adopts makes a clinical response difficult. If he had only presented the specifics of his proposal, than it would be easier for the audience to respond in a sanitized, detached manner. His language makes action more likely, since an absence of "moral zeal" as a dimension would allow his audience distance and would fail to engage them personally, thus "paralyzing" action on the part of his audience (Black, 1978, p. 86-87).

### **Judging Nuclear Jeremiads: Implications for the Future**

Examination of the Baruch Plan from the jeremiadic perspective and the illustration of the Baruch Plan as nuclear jeremiad affords implications for future critical studies of nuclear discourse. When viewing nuclear discourse, critics should be attuned to the appearance of epideictic elements in what might be seen at first blush as purely deliberative examples of nuclear discourse. A jeremiadic framework affords a potentially valuable perspective on nuclear discourse because it accomodates both the deliberative and epideictic demands of the genre.

First, the assessment of nuclear discourse which can be considered jeremiadic suggests that the critic should view texts as offering a moral view of a scientific/technological problem. The

rhetor in the jeremiad is seeking to affirm values in the audience and to adjust nuclear policy with those values. The critic evaluates not only the policy but the values offered by the rhetor in the jeremiad.

Second, nuclear jeremiads require the critic to be sensitive to changes that occur over time. The rhetor addresses future generations, given the transgenerational effects of nuclear weapons. The examination of the Baruch Plan from a jeremiadic perspective allows the speech to be praised as a success across time, yet damned as a failure in achieving the implementation of the policy in 1946. Judgment of nuclear jeremiads needs to be sensitive to the alteration of policy that may occur slowly. Also, since jeremiads are epideictic in function, as well as deliberative, the critic should be aware of adherence to values promoted over time. Policy change requires that the audience be convinced of the values implied by that action. The promotion of adherence to values is a worthy end of discourse itself: "the sharing of values is an end pursued independently of the precise circumstances in which this communion will be put to the test" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 53).

Third, criticism of nuclear jeremiads should reflect an awareness of the difficulty of action given the scientific nature of the problem. Given the difficulty for the audience in taking direct action, and because they may not perceive or really have the power to act, the critic should afford attention to indirect action. If the



rhetor empowers the audience in some manner by casting the problem in moral terms or by suggesting an action that can create the ability for long-term moral choices, than judgment of nuclear jeremiads need to account for this indirect form of action.

## **Conclusion**

This thesis has argued that examining the Baruch Plan from the generic perspective of the jeremiad provides unique and valuable insight into the speech itself. It has also suggested that the presence of deliberative and epideictic elements in jeremiads, coupled with the distinctive characteristics of the nuclear jeremiad, permits a positive assessment of the Baruch Plan and opens up the opportunity for critics to examine other nuclear discourse for signs of the jeremiad.

The Baruch Plan is a speech which "preserves a morally significant event" (Black, 1978, p. 89). It makes the early moments of the nuclear age "permanent in history -- timeless" by pointing to transcendent values and timely threats; making "available to the future the experience" of confronting and responding to an "objective occurrence that has struck the mind as morally critical" (Black, 1978, p. 89). Chapter One suggested that understanding the nuclear past is critical if we are to understand the nuclear present and future. The Baruch Plan's contribution to this process of peace is priceless, since it addresses itself to audiences of yesterday, today, and tomorrow. The speech expresses timeless truths about human

nature and the nature of nuclear weapons and war. Baruch makes clear the bleak future facing humanity if nuclear weapons are not controlled. To a great extent his prophecy has come true. "If, to some, Baruch has seemed a Jeremiah crying needless havoc, who is there today who would deny that his sharpest warnings have been justified by events?" (Rosenbloom, 1953, p. 312). The world today remains a slave of fear. The Baruch Plan is an effective speech since it expresses a vision that can motivate audiences today to consider the nature of war, the implications of nuclear weapons, to question the policies of their governments, and to push for action. To the extent that Baruch's speech-text helped and continues to help the dialogue begun in 1946 to continue today, and spurs people to become more aware of and more convinced of the evil of nuclear weapons, the Baruch Plan should be judged a success.

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## Appendix

### The Baruch Plan: Statement by United States Representative Baruch to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946

My fellow members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and my fellow citizens of the world: We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. That is our business. Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we have dmaned every man to be the slave of Fear. Let us not deceive ourselves: We must elect World Peace or World Destruction.

Science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its potentialities that our minds cower from the terror it creates. Yet terror is not enough to inihabit the use of the atomic bomb. The terror created by weapons has never stopped man from employing them. For each new weapon a defense has been produced, in time. But now we face a condition in which adequate defense does not exist.

Science, which gave us this dread power, shows that it can be made a giant help to humanity, but science does not show us how to prevent its baleful use. So we have been appointed to obviate that peril by finding a meeting of the minds and the hearts of our people. Only in the will of mankind lies the answer.

It is to express this will and make it effective that we have



been assembled. We must provide the mechanism to assure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in war. To that end, we must provide immediate, swift, and sure punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by the nations. Penalization is essential if peace is to be more than a feverish interlude between wars. And, too, the United Nations can prescribe individual responsibility and punishment on the principles applied at Nurnberg by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States -- a formula certain to benefit the world's future.

In this crisis, we represent not only our governments but, in a larger way, we represent the peoples of the world. We must remember that the peoples do not belong to the governments but that the governments belong to the peoples. We must answer their demands; we must answer the world's longing for peace and security.

In that desire the United States shares ardently and hopefully. The search of science for the absolute weapon has reached fruition in this country. But she stands ready to proscribe and destroy this instrument -- to lift its use from death to life -- if the world will join in a pact to that end.

In our success lies the promise of a new life, freed from the heart-stopping fears that now beset the world. The beginning of victory for the great ideals for which millions have bled and died lies in building a workable plan. Now we approach fulfilment of the

aspirations of mankind. At the end of the road lies the fairer, better, surer life we crave and mean to have.

Only by a lasting peace are liberties and democracies strengthened and deepened. War is their enemy. And it will not do to believe that any of us can escape war's devastation. Victor, vanquished, and neutrals alike are affected physically, economically, and morally.

Against the degradation of war we can erect a safeguard. That is the guerdon for which we reach. Within the scope of the formula we outline here there will be found, to those who seek it, the essential elements of our purpose. Others will see only emptiness. Each of us carries his own mirror in which is reflected hope -- or determined desperation -- courage or cowardice.

There is a famine throughout the world today. It starves men's bodies. But there is a greater famine -- the hunger of men's spirit. That starvation can be cured by the conquest of fear, and the substitution of hope, from which springs faith -- faith in each other, faith that we want to work together toward salvation, and determination that those who threaten the peace and safety shall be punished.

The peoples of these democracies gathered here have a particular concern with our answer, for their peoples hate war. They will have a heavy exaction to make of those who fail to provide an escape. They are not afraid of an internationalism that protects;

they are unwilling to be fobbed off by mouthings about narrow sovereignty, which is today's phrase for yesterday's isolation.

The basis of a sound foreign policy, in this new age, for all the nations here gathered, is that anything that happens, no matter where or how, which menaces the peace of the world, or the economic stability, concerns each and all of us.

That, roughly, may be said to be the central theme of the United Nations. It is with that thought we begin consideration of the most important subject that can engage mankind -- life itself.

Let there be no quibbling about the duty and the responsibility of this group and of the governments we represent. I was moved, in the afternoon of my life, to add my effort to gain the world's quest, by the broad mandate under which we were created. The resolution of the General Assembly, passed January 24, 1946 in London, reads:

"Section V. Terms of Reference of the Commission

"The Commission shall proceed with the utmost dispatch and enquire into all phases of the problems, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible. In particular the Commission shall make specific proposals:

- (a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;
- (b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;

(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;

(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken. . . . "

Our mandate rests, in text and in spirit, upon the outcome of the Conference in Moscow of Messrs. Molotov of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bevin of the United Kingdom, and Byrnes of the United States of America. The three Foreign Ministers on December 27, 1945 proposed the establishment of this body.

Their action was animated by a preceding conference in Washington on November 15, 1945, when the President of the United States, associated with Mr. Attlee, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and Mr. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, stated that international control of the whole field of atomic energy was immediately essential. They proposed the formation of this body. In examining that source, the Agreed Declaration, it will be found that the fathers of the concept recognized the final means of world salvation -- the abolition of war. Solemnly they wrote:

"We are aware that the only complete protection for the civilized world from the destructive use of scientific knowledge lies in the prevention of war. No system of safeguards that can be devised will of itself provide an effective guarantee against production of atomic weapons by a nation bent on aggression. Nor can we ignore the possibility of the development of other weapons, or of new methods of warfare, which may constitute as great a threat to civilization as the military use of atomic energy."

Through the historical approach I have outlined, we find ourselves here to test if man can produce, through his will and faith, the miracle of peace, just as he has, through science and skill, the miracle of the atom.

The United States proposes the creation of an international Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material and including --

- 1) Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.
- 2) Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.
- 3) The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.
- 4) Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and

therefore to detect, misuse of atomic energy. To be effective, the Authority must itself be the world's leader in the field of atomic knowledge and development and thus supplement its legal authority with the great power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge.

I offer this as a basis for beginning our discussion.

But I think the peoples we serve would not believe -- and without faith nothing counts -- that a treaty, merely outlawing possession or use of the atomic bomb, constitutes effective fulfilment of the instructions to this Commission. Previous failures have been recorded in trying the method of simple renunciation, unsupported by effective guaranties of security and armament limitation. No one would have faith in that approach alone.

Now, if ever, is the time to act for the common good. Public opinion supports a world movement toward security. If I read the signs aright, the peoples want a program not composed merely of pious thoughts but of enforceable sanctions -- an international law with teeth in it.

We of this nation, desirous of helping to bring peace to the world and realizing the heavy obligations upon us arising from our possession of the means of producing the bomb and from the fact that it is part of our armament, are prepared to make our full contribution toward effective control of atomic energy.

When an adequate system for control of atomic energy,

including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes, we propose that --

- 1) Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;
- 2) Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty; and
- 3) The Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy.

Let me repeat, so as to avoid misunderstanding: My country is ready to make its full contribution toward the end we seek, subject of course to our constitutional processes and to an adequate system of control becoming fully effective, as we finally work it out.

Now as to violations: In the agreement, penalties of as serious nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their execution as possible should be fixed for -

- 1) Illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb;
- 2) Illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb;
- 3) Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed by the Authority;
- 4) Willful interference with the activities of the Authority;
- 5) Creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the absence of, a license granted by the

international body.

It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to lend myself, were I not to say to you and to our peoples that the matter of punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system. It might as well be admitted, here and now, that the subject goes straight to the veto power contained in the Charter of the United Nations so far as it relates to the field of atomic energy. The Charter permits penalization only by concurrence of each of the five great powers -- the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, China, France, and the United States.

I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the veto power only as it affects this particular problem. There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes.

The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to die. The time between violation and preventive action or punishment would be all too short for extended discussion as to the course to be followed.

As matters now stand several years may be necessary for another country to produce a bomb, *do novo*. However, once the basic information is generally known, and the Authority has established producing plants for peaceful purposes in the several countries, an illegal seizure of such a plant might permit a malevolent nation to produce a bomb in 12 months, and if preceded by secret preparation



and necessary facilities perhaps even in a much shorter time. The time required -- the advance warning given of the possible use of a bomb -- can only be generally estimated but obviously will depend upon many factors, including the success with which the Authority has been able to introduce elements of safety in the design of its plants and the degree to which illegal and secret preparation for the military use of atomic energy will have been eliminated. Presumably no nation would think of starting a war with only one bomb.

This shows how imperative speed is in detecting and penalizing violations.

The process of prevention and penalization -- a problem of profound statecraft -- is, as I read it, implicit in the Moscow statement, signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and the United Kingdom a few months ago.

But before a country is ready to relinquish any winning weapons it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have a guarantee of safety, not only against the offenders in the atomic area but against the illegal users of other weapons -- bacteriological, biological, gas - perhaps- why not? -- against war itself.

In the elimination of war lies our solution, for only then will nations cease to compete with one another in the production and use of dread "secret" weapons which are evaluated solely by their

capacity to kill. This devilish program takes us back not merely to the Dark Ages but from cosmos to chaos. If we succeed in finding a suitable way to control atomic weapons, it is reasonable to hope that we may also preclude the use of other weapons adaptable to mass destruction. When a man learns to say "A" he can, if he chooses, learn the rest of the alphabet too.

Let this be anchored in our minds:

Peace is never long preserved by weight of metal or by an armament race. Peace can be made tranquil and secure only by understanding and agreement fortified by sanctions. We must embrace international cooperation or international disintegration.

Science has taught us how to put the atom to work. But to make it work for good instead of for evil lies in the domain dealing with the principles of human duty. We are now facing a problem more of ethics than of physics.

The solution will require apparent sacrifice in pride and in position, but better pain as the price of peace than death as the price of war.

I now submit the following measures as representing the fundamental features of a plan which would give effect to certain of the conclusions which I have epitomized.

1. General. The Authority should set up a thorough plan for control of the field of atomic energy, through various forms of ownership, dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research , and

management by competent personnel. After this is provided for, there should be as little interference as may be with the economic plans and the present private, corporate, and state relationships in the several countries involved.

2. Raw Materials. The Authority should have as one of its earliest purposes to obtain and maintain complete and accurate information on world supplies of uranium and thorium and to bring them under its dominion. The precise pattern of control for various types of deposits of such materials will have to depend upon the geological, mining, refining, and economic facts involved in different nations.

The Authority should conduct continuous surveys so that it will have the most complete knowledge of the world geology of uranium and thorium. Only after all current information on world sources of uranium and thorium is known to us all can equitable plans be made for their production, refining, and distribution.

3. Primary Production Plants. The Authority should exercise complete managerial control of the production of fissionable materials. This means that it should control and operate all plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and must own and control the product of these plants.

4. Atomic Explosives. The Authority should be given sole and exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives. Research activities in the field of atomic explosives are essential in

order that the Authority may keep in the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy and fulfill the objective of preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by maintaining its position as the best-informed agency will the Authority be able to determine the line between intrinsically dangerous and non-dangerous activities.

5. Strategic Distribution of Activities and Materials. The activities entrusted exclusively to the Authority because they are intrinsically dangerous to security should be distributed throughout the world. Similarly, stockpiles of raw materials and fissionable materials should not be centralized.

6. Non-Dangerous Activities. A function of the Authority should be promotion of the peacetime benefits of atomic energy.

Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of research reactors; the production of radioactive tracers by means of non-dangerous reactors, the use of such tracers, and to some extent the production of power should be open to nations and their citizens under reasonable licensing arrangements from the Authority.

Denatured materials, whose use we know also requires suitable safeguards, should be furnished for such purposes by the Authority under lease or other arrangement. Denaturing seems to have been overestimated by the public as a safety measure.

7. Definition of Dangerous and Non-Dangerous Activities. Although a reasonable dividing line can be drawn between dangerous

and non-dangerous activities, it is not hard and fast. Provision should, therefore, be made to assure constant reexamination of the questions and to permit revision of the dividing line as changing conditions and new discoveries may require.

8. Operations of Dangerous Activities. Any plant dealing with uranium or thorium after it once reaches the potential of dangerous use must be not only subject to the most rigorous and competent inspection by the Authority, but its actual operation shall be under the management, supervision, and control of the Authority.

9. Inspection. By assigning intrinsically dangerous activities exclusively to the Authority, the difficulties of inspection are reduced. If the Authority is the only agency which may lawfully conduct dangerous activities, then visible operation by others than the Authority will constitute an unambiguous danger signal. Inspection will also occur in connection with the licensing functions of the Authority.

10. Freedom of Access. Adequate ingress and egress for all qualified representatives of the Authority must be assured. Many of the inspection activities of the Authority should grow out of, and be incidental to, its other functions. Important measures of inspection will be associated with the tight control of raw materials, for this is a keystone of the plan. The continuing activities of prospecting, survey, and research in relation to raw materials will be designed not only to serve the affirmative development functions of the

Authority but also to assure that no surreptitious operations are conducted in the raw-materials field by nations or their citizens.

11. Personnel. The personnel of the Authority should be recruited on a basis of proven competence but also so far as possible on an international basis.

12. Progress by Stages. A primary step in the creation of the system of control is the setting forth, in comprehensive terms, of the functions, responsibilities, powers, and limitations of the Authority. Once a charter for the Authority has been adopted, the Authority and the system of control for which it will be responsible will require time to become fully organized and effective. The plan of control will, therefore, have to come into effect in successive stages. These should be specifically fixed in the charter or means should be otherwise set forth in the charter for transitions from one stage to another, as contemplated in the resolution of the United Nations Assembly which created this Commission.

13. Disclosures. In the deliberations of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy, the United States is prepared to make available the information essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals which it advocates. Further disclosures must be dependent in the interests of all, upon the effective ratification of the treaty. When the Authority is actually created, the United States will join the other nations in making available the further information essential to that organization for the performance of its

functions. As the successive stages of international control are reached, the United States will be prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control of activities in this field to the Authority.

14. International Control. There will be questions about the extent of control to be allowed to national bodies, when the Authority is established. Purely national authorities for control and development of atomic energy should to the extent necessary for the effective operation of the Authority be subordinate to it. This is neither an endorsement nor a disapproval of the creation of national authorities. The Commission should evolve a clear demarcation of the scope of duties and responsibilities of such national authorities.

And now I end. I have submitted an outline for present discussion. Our consideration will be broadened by the criticism of the United States proposals and by the plans of the other nations, which, it is to be hoped, will be submitted at their early convenience. I and my associates of the United States Delegation will make available to each member of this body books and pamphlets, including the Acheson-Lilienthal report, recently made by the United States Department of State, and the McMahon Committee Monograph No.1 entitled "Essential Information on Atomic Energy" relating to the McMahon bill recently passed by the United States Senate, which may prove of value in assessing the situation.

All of us are consecrated to making an end of gloom and

hopelessness. It will not be an easy job. The way is long and thorny, but supremely worth traveling. All of us want to stand erect, with our faces to the sun, instead of being forced to burrow into the ground, like rats.

The pattern of salvation must be worked out by all for all.

The light at the end of the tunnel is dim, but our path seems to grow brighter as we actually begin our journey. We cannot yet light the way to the end. However, we hope the suggestions of my Government will be illuminating.

Let us keep in mind the exhortation of Abraham Lincoln, whose words, uttered at a moment of shattering national peril, form a complete text for our deliberation. I quote, paraphrasing slightly:

"We cannot escape history. We of this meeting will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we are passing will light us down in honor or dishonor to the latest generation.

We say we are for Peace. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save Peace. The world knows that we do. We, even we here, hold the power and have the responsibility.

We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just -- a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud."

My thanks for your attention.



**THE BARUCH PLAN AND THE NUCLEAR JEREMIAD**

by

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### Abstract

This thesis examines a speech delivered to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 by Bernard Baruch. It argues that significant insight can be made into the speech by examining the Baruch Plan from the rhetorical perspective of the jeremiad genre. It argues that a generic framework approaches jeremiadic discourse as containing both deliberative and epideictic elements. As such, judgments of success and failure need to take generic characteristics of nuclear discourse into account. It further argues that the Baruch Plan can usefully be characterized as a "nuclear jeremiad," a form of the traditional jeremiad that is attuned to the nature of a nuclear world.